This dissertation examines the fundamental concept of two-sided matching from four different perspectives. The first essay introduces the concept of intercorrelation in preference lists and considers how different degrees of intercorrelation impact the outcomes of centralized matching markets governed by the Gale-Shapley mechanism. The second essay considers how different degrees of both correlation and intercorrelation in preference lists can impact the length of time a decentralized market takes to reach a stable outcome via a randomized tatonnement process. The third essay dissects the strategic behavior of labor market participants as they compete with one another in the matching game that brings together employers and employees, and then extrapolates what that behavior means for the labor market as a whole in terms of unemployment and welfare. The last essay takes a more dynamic look at the labor market, treating it as an intergenerational matching game to investigate the phenomenon of economic stratification and to find out what effects policies aimed at improving intergenerational mobility might have on economic growth.To clarify, consider the following three examples. Example 2.1. Positively Intercorrelated Preferences. Chen and Sonmez (2006) study student assignment in Boston, where law mandates that schools give preference to students who live anbsp;...
|Title||:||Essays on the Analysis and Implications of Two-sided Matching Markets|
|Publisher||:||ProQuest - 2009|