It was while reading HusserI's Cartesian Meditations that the subject of the present volume first occurred to me. And in a way I am offering a somewhat oblique commentary on HusserI's Meditations - qobliqueq because it is not a systematic elucidation of the entire text. Nonetheless, it is primarily with the task of the Meditations that I am concerned. It is there that the antipathy between natural ~anguage and HusserI's quest for certainty come clearIy into focus. (Other texts are cited insofar as they shed light on this central work or illustrate the fact that HusserI did not significantly alter his position on the problem. ) My purpose here is to further sharpen that focus, showing that the consciousness within the phenomenological reductions is essentially language using. Working with the Wittgensteinian insight regarding qpri vate languages, q I attempt to show that a language-using con sciousness cannot effectively divorce itself from its social context and is unable, therefore, to perform the radical phenomenological reductions. Solipsism, then, is never a genuine problem, but nei ther is the elimination of all existential commitments a genuine possibility. Finally, I conclude that language-use bridges the distinction between essence and existence, the transcendental and the transcendent, the ideal and the real-making the phenomeno logical method incapable of providing the apodictic foundations on which all metaphysics and science will be rebuilt.Itwillbe helpful to recall here the two forms of passive reception about which Husserl had spoken earlier athe receptivity ... linked with the constitution of perceptual objects from sensations; the second, I believe, calls for the use of language.
|Title||:||Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl|
|Publisher||:||Springer Science & Business Media - 2012-12-06|