It is often presumed that the laws of nature have special significance for scientific reasoning. But the laws' distinctive roles have proven notoriously difficult to identify--leading some philosophers to question if they hold such roles at all. This study offers original accounts of the roles that natural laws play in connection with counterfactual conditionals, inductive projections, and scientific explanations, and of what the laws must be in order for them to be capable of playing these roles. Particular attention is given to laws of special sciences, levels of scientific explanation, natural kinds, ceteris-paribus clauses, and physically necessary non-laws.So it is important that the gravitational force law is applicable no matter what other influences are at work. That certain inferential steps can ... It is revealing to see how Gierea#39;s (1988) response to the problem of provisos fails to capture this point. Giere holds that certain ... an easy problem. Having already accepted these laws, and having recognized the proper way to add forces and to use the net force onanbsp;...
|Title||:||Natural Laws in Scientific Practice|
|Author||:||Chapel Hill Marc Lange Professor of Philosophy University of North Carolina|
|Publisher||:||Oxford University Press, USA - 2000-05-15|