This first extensive study of Spinoza's philosophy of mind concentrates on two problems crucial to the philosopher's thoughts on the matter: the requirements for having a thought about a particular object, and the problem of the mind's relation to the body. Della Rocca contends that Spinoza's positions are systematically connected with each other and with a principle at the heart of his metaphysical system: his denial of causal or explanatory relations between the mental and the physical. In this way, Della Rocca's exploration of these two problems provides a new and illuminating perspective on Spinoza's philosophy as a system.See also content; ideas; mind and the causal requirement on representation, 73- 74 and Davidson, 74, 155-56 and the mind-relativity of content, 74- 75, 83 Hume, David, 41, 181n60, n61, n64 ideas. See also adequacy; confusion; content; falsity anbsp;...
|Title||:||Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza|
|Author||:||Michael Della Rocca Assistant Professor of Philosophy Yale University|
|Publisher||:||Oxford University Press, USA - 1996-10-21|