The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds. Professor Shoemaker opposes the qinner senseq conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have nonrepresentational features--qqualiaq--that determine what it is like to have them. Among the other topics covered are the unity of consciousness, and the idea that the qfirst-person perspectiveq gives a privileged route to philosophical understanding of the nature of mind.Only very minor changes have been made in the other essays, although in some cases new notes have been added. While all of the essays in the volume deal in one way or other with aquot;the first-person perspective, aquot; the title essay, as distinctanbsp;...
|Title||:||The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays|
|Publisher||:||Cambridge University Press - 1996-09-13|