In the second essay, qPolitical Compromise and Bureaucratic Structure: The Political Origins of the Federal Reserve Systemq (coauthored with Gary Miller and Andy Sobel), we examine the political origins of central bank independence. Using the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 as a critical case and applying an agenda-constrained ideal point estimation technique, we show that political compromise and political uncertainty among conflicting social interests provided an insulated bureaucracy that was crucial for the credible commitment to anti-inflationary monetary policies.In the first essay, aquot;Constituent Influence on International Trade Policy in the United States, 1987 to 2006, aquot; I identify social interests that have significant influence on international trade policy. Applying a hierarchical ideal point estimationanbsp;...
|Title||:||Three Essays on Domestic Sources of Credible Commitment: Interests, Legislators, and Bureaucrats|
|Publisher||:||ProQuest - 2008|