The third essay develops a simple spatial model of fundraising in which charities select a target population to solicit donations. First, we show that in a competitive charity market without any intervention, the number of charities in the market and (or) overall net funds raised by charities may be sub-optimal. Next, we analyze whether a social planner can prevent such shortcomings and show that simple regulatory powers suffice to achieve socially optimal outcomes. This paper's contributions are both descriptive and normative. As a descriptive contribution, it introduces a model in which some donors are solicited by multiple charities, which results in excessive fundraising. As a normative contribution, in contrast to the previous literature, this model does not necessarily produce monopoly as the optimal market structure. We show that if fixed costs associated with establishing charities are sufficiently low, then the optimal market structure is not a monopoly. Given the importance of the trade-off between the volume and variety of charitable services, we argue that this result may be of particular interest to policy makers.The third essay develops a simple spatial model of fundraising in which charities select a target population to solicit donations.
|Title||:||Three Essays on the Economics of Charitable Giving: Implications for Fundraising and Public Policy Towards the Non-profit Sector|
|Author||:||Baris K. Yoruk|
|Publisher||:||ProQuest - 2008|